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Do Donors Care About 
Declining Trade Revenue from Liberalization?
An Analysis of Bilateral Aid Allocation
Javed Younas and Subhayu Bandyopadhyay
Many developing-country governments rely heavily on trade tax revenue. Therefore, trade liberal-
ization can be a potential source of significant fiscal instability and may affect government spending
on development activities—at least in the short run. This article investigates whether donors use
aid to compensate recipient nations for lost trade revenue or perhaps to reward them for moving
toward freer trade regimes. The authors do not find empirical evidence supporting such motives.
This is of some concern because binding government revenue constraints may hinder development
prospects of some poorer nations. The authors use fixed effects to control for the usual political,
strategic, and other considerations for aid allocations. (JEL F35, H0)
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taxes or possibly trade taxes owing to the volume
effect) as a result of rising national income levels.
However, even in the case of potentially success-
ful liberalization, the donors may be concerned
about the short-run budgetary implications of
trade liberalization for the poorest of nations.
In principle, even in the short run, revenue
losses from trade liberalization may be offset by
turning to less-distortionary alternative sources
of revenue. This approach requires good gover-
nance and an efficient domestic tax system; how-
ever, the evidence for this alternative is somewhat
disheartening. For example, Baunsgaard and Keen
(2005) argue that middle- and low-income coun-
tries fail to achieve substantial tax reforms to
replace the lost trade revenue by revenue from
other sources. They find that middle-income coun-
tries recovered 45 to 60 cents from other sources
for every one-dollar loss in trade tax revenue,
whereas low-income countries could recover no
more than 30 cents for each lost dollar. Khattry
A
fter successive Uruguay Round nego-
tiations and the creation of the World
Trade Organization in the 1990s, many
developing countries chose to disman-
tle their trade barriers and open their economies
to international competition. Transition to free
trade may involve substantial short-run costs
for developing governments, especially in terms
of a decline in tax revenues. Many developing
countries rely heavily on trade tax revenue, and
a reduction or elimination of these taxes may be
a source of their fiscal instability. To the extent
that public spending is targeted at useful pro-
grams (e.g., schools, infrastructure, health), the
transition to free trade initially may result in a
significant loss for a poor nation. In the long run,
if liberalization is successful, these problems
would be expected to be addressed both by pro-
vision of better private markets and rising rev-
enues from different sources (income and sales
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revenue constraints remain even after a decade of
trade reforms, and they emphasize the need for a
fiscally realistic development strategy in the post-
liberalization period. In a broader analysis of the
limitations of trade policy reform in developing
countries, Rodrik (1992) argues that tariff reduc-
tion at the cost of fiscal considerations can have
disastrous consequences. He cites the examples
of Turkey and Morocco, where trade taxes were
reimposed because of fiscal problems.
The logic of compensating trade-liberalizing
developing nations is consistent with the foreign
aid objectives of reducing poverty and promoting
economic development, captured in the Develop  -
ment Assistance Committee (DAC) guidelines
for poverty reduction of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).1
Moreover, donor nations may also be driven by
the motivation to pursue their own economic
interests in their potential export markets (see
Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976; Neumayer,
2003; and Younas, 2008). Indeed, aid in “bailing
out” liberalizing nations may also relate to the
self-interest motive outlined in these contribu-
tions. Donors may worry that fiscal crisis may halt
or reverse trade liberalization, which would not
benefit the donors’ export interests. Therefore, to
maintain trade relations, they may compensate
developing nations that experience a decline in
trade tax revenues.2
Despite the sizeable literature in this broad
area of trade and foreign aid, empirical analysis
of the impact of trade liberalization and declin-
ing trade revenues on foreign aid allocation is
sparse.3 Most studies focus on the political and
strategic interests of donors; others analyze their
developmental and humanitarian concerns; and
some investigate both aspects.4 Recent studies
have explored other aspects of donors’ aid allo-
cation, such as colonial ties of aid-recipient coun-
tries and support to donor countries in U.N. voting
(Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Burnside and Dollar,
2000; and Kuziemko and Werker, 2006). Dollar
and Levin (2004) find that overall more aid has
been allocated to poor countries that have reason-
ably good economic governance. They find, how-
ever, that this pattern is somewhat different
between bilateral and multilateral donors. We
complement the literature by empirically inves-
tigating the effect of declining trade revenue on
aid allocation decisions.
We estimate the effects of revenue collection
(from import duties and international trade taxes)
on aggregate bilateral aid allocation given by 22
DAC-member countries of the OECD to 52 aid-
recipient countries over the 1991–2003 period.5
We use fixed effects to control for the usual politi-
cal, strategic, and other considerations for aid
allocations. Our central finding is that there is no
statistically significant evidence that supports
the hypothesis that donors compensate for trade
revenue losses of the recipients.
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. The next section provides the empirical
model and methodology, followed by the data
description section. The third section presents
the estimation results, and the final section con-
tains our summary and conclusion.
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND
METHODOLOGY
Three goals guide our sample selection. First,
we include only middle- and low-income aid-
recipient countries because past studies conclude
that they face the highest uncompensated loss
of tax trade revenue from trade liberalization
Younas and Bandyopadhyay
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1 For example, see the guidelines at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/
14/2672735.pdf.
2 Bagwell and Staiger (2001) analyze reciprocal and mutually
advantageous trade liberalization agreements.
3 There are, however, some theoretical contributions on this issue.
For example, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (1997) present a model
in which recipient nations compete to give tariff concessions to
donors to receive a larger share of foreign aid.
4 See, for example, McKinlay and Little (1977 and 1979), Maizels
and Nissanke (1984), Dowling and Hiemenz (1985), Trumbull and 
Wall (1994), Wall (1995), Neumayer (2003), and Bandyopadhyay
and Wall (2007).
5 The sample of aid-recipient countries is constrained by the non-
availability of consistent yearly data, and most data are available
only for years after 1990. Since many studies find that contain-
ment of communism rather than development concerns was a
major factor for providing aid during the Cold War era, we limit
our analysis to the post-Cold War period (see Boschini and
Olofsgård, 2007).(Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005; Khattry and Rao,
2002; Rodrik, 1992).6 Second, we exclude Israel
and Egypt from the data because both countries
receive a disproportionately higher amount of
aid from the United States, largely based on their
strategic locations in the Middle East. Third, we
limit our analysis to the post-Cold War period
because containment of communism rather than
development concerns was a major factor for pro-
viding aid during the Cold War era (see Boschini
and Olofsgård, 2007).
Our empirical model of bilateral aid from 22
DAC-member countries of the OECD to 52 aid-
recipient countries takes the following form:
(1)
where i = aid-recipient countries, t = years, and
the following apply to each recipient country:
baid = total real bilateral aid
pop = population size 
inc = per capita income 
mor = the infant mortality rate 
rights = level of political rights and civil
liberties 
imd = real revenue from import duties 
ttr = real revenue from international trade
taxes7
maid = total real multilateral aid 
ʲi = recipient-specific fixed effects
ʻt = year dummy variables
ﾵit = error term
Aid and per capita income may be either
substitutes or complements. They will be substi-
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tutes if compassion or altruism is the driving force.
In this case, more aid is given when per capita
income falls. In addition, we also introduce a
squared term for per capita income to determine
whether this effect increases for poorer nations.
Population is included to capture the difference
in recipient-country size (Bandyopadhyay and
Wall, 2007). The sign of its coefficient will sug-
gest whether a population-related bias exists in
aid allocation.
Per capita income alone may not be an ade-
quate reflection of economic need, especially in
view of high income inequalities in several recip-
ient countries. This prompted our use of the
infant mortality rate, which relates to the con-
cept of individual well-being. This variable is
also used in the existing literature as a measure
of a nation’s well-being (Trumbull and Wall, 1994;
Wall, 1995; Bandyopadhyay and Wall, 2007;
Younas, 2008).8-10 The political rights and civil
liberties variable, which is used as a proxy for
human rights, captures the donor’s perception of
the objective function of the recipient government:
If a recipient government values human rights,
the perception may be that it puts a higher weight
on its peoples’ welfare and would use the aid to
improve their well-being. 
We expect to see a negative relation between
revenue from international trade taxes (or from
import duties) and aid if donors either (i) com-
pensate for revenue losses from trade liberaliza-
tion or (ii) reward the nations that engage in such
liberalization. We note, however, that these two
motives are distinct in principle but observation-
ally equivalent. Following Younas (2008) we
also include real multilateral aid to a recipient
Younas and Bandyopadhyay
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW MAY/JUNE 2009 143
6 The World Bank (2006) classifies aid-recipient countries into
high-income non-OECD, middle-income, and low-income countries.
7 Revenue from international trade taxes and from import duties is
not included simultaneously in the regression because of very high
correlation between them.
8 The World Bank (2006) defines the infant mortality rate as the
number of infants who die before 1 year of age per 1,000 live births
in a given year.
9 Per capita income captures economic needs, whereas infant mor-
tality signifies physical needs (Trumbull and Wall, 1994; Wall, 1995;
and Bandyopadhyay and Wall, 2007). Bandyopadhyay and Wall
(2007) note that although economic and physical needs are clearly
correlated in the long run, they do not necessarily move in the same
direction over shorter periods.
10 Correlations among the independent variables are not high, with
the exception of that between per capita income and the infant
mortality rate. To check whether multicollinearity poses a problem,
eigenvalues for correlations among explanatory variables were
tested and found to be low.country.11 Bilateral and multilateral aid may be
either substitutes or complements. They will be
substitutes if donor nations reduce their aid allo-
cation to a recipient that also receives aid from
multilateral agencies. They will be complements
if donor nations provide more aid to maintain
their political influence on a recipient.
To control for the usual political, strategic,
and other considerations for aid allocations by
donors, we introduce recipient-specific fixed
effects in the model. Finally, we include time
dummy variables that are common to all aid recip-
ients within a given year. Time dummies control
for events such as a flood or a drought within a
particular year, which may lead to an aid spike
for the corresponding year.12 Moreover, all regres-
sions are estimated using feasible generalized
least squares allowing for recipient-specific
heteroskedasticity.
Because most explanatory variables vary
across a wide range (such as population size, per
capita income, international trade tax revenue,
and revenue from import duties) and exhibit
skewed distributions, we use the natural log of
all variables. Also, we use a log-log model to help
reduce outlier effects, and the resulting coefficients
are interpreted as elasticities.
Before proceeding to estimation, we address
the possibility of simultaneous causation between
aid and per capita income. It may be argued that
per capita income of a recipient may be endoge-
nous because it not only affects the donor’s deci-
sion to provide aid but also may be affected by
the flow of aid.13 Wooldridge (2003) states that if
we assume that the error term, ﾵit, is uncorrelated
(a standard assumption) with all past endogenous
and exogenous variables, then lagged endogenous
variables in simultaneous models are treated as
predetermined variables and are uncorrelated
with ﾵit.14 Following that technique, we use a 1-
year-lagged value for all independent variables
in our econometric model. This makes sense as
information to the donors about a recipient is
available only with some time lag (Younas, 2008).




The data for aggregate net bilateral aid to 52
recipient countries for the 1992–2003 period are
from OECD International Development Statistics
(OECD, 2005).15 The data contain aid given for
development purposes only and do not include
grants, loans, and credits for military purposes.16
Data for multilateral aid are also from the same
source.
Data for revenue from international trade
taxes and import duties are from Government
Finance Statistics (International Monetary Fund
[IMF], 2005) and World Development Indicators
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11 The multilateral aid is given by the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations, including their
regional branches.
12 Inclusion of time-specific dummy variables allows each time period
to have its own intercept for aggregate time effects that affect all
recipients. Also, one time-specific dummy must be dropped to
avoid perfect collinearity. We also drop one recipient-specific
dummy in the fixed effects model for the same reason.
13 Most literature on aid shows that aid does not cause growth. Thus,
there is little reason to believe that there would be reverse causa-
tion from aid to per capita income.
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14 Maizels and Nissanke (1984), while citing Maddala (1977), state
that “all estimation techniques, including 2SLS [two-stage least
squares], are designed to deal only with the contemporaneous
simultaneity and the lagged endogenous variables are treated in
simultaneous models as predetermined variables along with other
exogenous variables in the system.” Therefore, if aid flows can be
assumed to affect a country’s economic performance with some
time lag, the problem of simultaneous bias is considerably lessened.
15 Bilateral aid is from 22 DAC-member countries of the OECD
(Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, and the United States). Eight aid-recipient coun-
tries in our dataset received no aid or negative aid (net payer) for
1 or a maximum of 2 years in the 12 yearly time periods in our
sample. We placed a value 0 for such observations.
16 Following Neumayer (2003) and Younas (2008), we converted the
aid data into constant year-2000 U.S. dollars using the unit value
of the world import price index; data are from the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (2005).([WDI], World Bank, 2006). The revenue data are
given in the national currency of each country.
We have converted these data into U.S. dollars
using the exchange rate for each country for each
year.17 As we did for the aid data, we also con-
verted international trade tax revenue and import
duties into constant year-2000 U.S. dollars using
the unit value of the world import price index.18
The data appendix shows the countries’ average
data on trade tax revenue variables, both in levels
and also as ratios of total tax revenue. According
to WDI (World Bank, 2006), taxes on international
trade include import duties, export duties, profits
of export or import monopolies, exchange profits,
and exchange taxes, whereas import duties com-
prise all levies collected on goods at the point of
entry into the country. The levies may be imposed
for revenue or protection purposes and may be
determined on a specific or ad valorem basis, as
long as they are restricted to imported products.19
Per capita income is measured by per capita
gross domestic product (purchasing power parity)
at constant year-2000 U.S. dollars. Data for per
capita GDP, population, and infant mortality rates
are obtained from WDI (World Bank, 2006).20 We
use indices for political rights and civil liberties
produced by Freedom House (2006) as a proxy for
human rights measure. “Political rights” refer to
the freedom of people to participate in the politi-
cal process by exercising their voting rights, the
right to organize political parties to compete for
public office, and the ability to form an effective
opposition and elect representatives who devise
public policies and are accountable for their
actions. “Civil liberties” entail the freedom of
expression and religious belief, the prevalence of
rule of law, the right to form unions, the freedom
to marry, and the freedom to travel. It also signi-
fies the autonomy of citizens without interference
from the state. These two indicators are derived
from a cross-country survey every year. Each of
these indices is measured on a scale from 1 (best)
to 7 (worst) points. Following the literature on
aid (see, for example, Trumbull and Wall, 1994;
Wall, 1995; Neumayer, 2003; and Younas, 2008),
we constructed a combined freedom index by
adding indices of political rights and civil liber-
ties, and then reverted that index so that it ranges
from 2 (worst) to 14 (best) points. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the correlations between
real bilateral aid and revenue from international
trade taxes and revenue from import duties,
respectively. The correlation pattern gives a crude
idea that aid is concentrated mostly toward recip-
ients with low revenue from import duties and
international trade taxes. The correlation pattern
of bilateral aid and ratios of revenue from inter-
national trade taxes to total tax revenue and the
ratio of revenue from import duties to total tax
revenue in Figures 3 and 4 also seem to suggest a
somewhat similar pattern.
RESULTS
The correlations suggest higher aid allocation
to countries experiencing a decline in interna-
tional trade revenues. To ascertain the existence
of any significant econometric relationship, we
run regressions by simultaneously controlling
for all explanatory variables in our model to find
their individual effects on aid.
Model without Fixed Effects
We first estimate the model under the restric-
tion that fixed effects for donors’ considerations
for aid allocations do not matter (ʲi = 0￿i). All
regressions are estimated using feasible general-
ized least squares allowing for recipient-specific
heteroske  dasticity. The results are presented in
Younas and Bandyopadhyay
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17 Data for exchange rates are from International Finance Statistics
(IMF, 2004). 
18 A few countries in our sample do not have complete observations
for revenue from international trade taxes and import duties for all
12 yearly time periods. 
19 Because it cannot be stated with certainty that a decline in trade
tax revenue is always the consequence of trade liberalization, we
regressed the ratio of trade tax revenue to total tax revenue on the
trade openness index devised by Sachs and Warner (1995). In addi-
tion, we used the economic globalization index of Dreher (2006).
The results show that both trade openness and economic globaliza-
tion cause a decline in trade tax revenue in developing countries
(these results are available from the authors on request). Although
these findings may not be conclusive, our study mainly aims to
analyze whether donor countries compensate recipient countries
for declining trade tax revenue.
20 Some data values are missing for some countries for infant mortal-
ity rates. Because infant mortality rates change slowly over time,
values for missing observations are interpolated by calculating
averages from available values.columns 1 and 2 of Table 1. Surprisingly, the effect
of the key variable of interest—revenue from
import duties—is positive and statistically signifi-
cant at the 10 percent level. This peculiar result
is somewhat confusing as it seems to suggest that
more aid goes to recipients experiencing an
increase in trade tax revenue. However, we cannot
rely on this result because without controlling
for fixed effects, the estimates will be biased and
inconsistent. This effect can be more prevalent in
our study because past literature reports on aid
conclude that bilateral donors’ political, strategic,
and other considerations also determine their aid
allocation decisions for such countries.
On the other hand, the impact of all other vari-
ables except political rights and civil liberties is
statistically different from zero. According to t-
statistics, their coefficients are significant at the
1 percent level. The hill-shaped relationship
between aid and population suggests a bias in
aid allocation toward less-populated developing
countries (Bandyopadhyay and Wall, 2007). This
also implies that countries such as India, China,
and Pakistan remain at a disadvantage in garner-
ing more aid because of their large populations.
Per capita income and infant mortality rates
appear to be important indicators of bilateral aid
allocation. A 1 percent increase in the infant mor-
tality rate has an impact of a 0.24 percent increase
in aid allocation. The positive but quadratic rela-
tionship between aid and per capita income sug-
Younas and Bandyopadhyay
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Figure 2
Correlation Between Aid and Revenue from International Trade Taxesgests that the donors do not favor the poorest of
developing nations, although this pattern is
reduced toward the higher end of the income
scale. The level of aid is not responsive to political
rights and civil liberties.
The positive and significant coefficient on
multilateral aid suggests that donor countries
provide more aid to recipient countries that also
receive aid from multilateral agencies.21 This
result is also consistent with a previous finding
(Younas, 2008). Omitting revenue from import
duties from the regression and including revenue
from international trade taxes yields similar results
(Table 1, column 2).
Model with Fixed Effects
Now we estimate the model without imposing
the restrictions that the fixed effects are all zero
(columns 3 and 4 of Table 1). This is the preferred
model because it controls for the donors’ usual
political, strategic, and other considerations of aid
allocations. We find that only per capita income,
its squared term, and multilateral aid are statisti-
cally significant. Trade revenue variables are sta-
tistically insignificant in both of the fixed-effects
regressions. This suggests that donors do not
appear to consider recipients’ trade revenue levels
in their aid allocation decisions.
Younas and Bandyopadhyay
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21 Because bilateral donors provide funds to multilateral agencies
(e.g., World Bank, IMF, United Nations), their likely influence over
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Correlation Between Aid and Ratio of Revenue from International Trade Taxes to Total Tax RevenueThis evidence is somewhat disheartening
because past studies have found that most revenue
losses from international trade taxes in develop-
ing countries are not compensated from other
domestic sources (Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005;
Khattry and Rao, 2002; Rodrik, 1992). The likeli-
hood-ratio test also rejects the null hypothesis
that the fixed effects are all zero, implying that
this is the statistically superior model. It is also
the preferred model because it controls for donors’
usual political, strategic, and other considerations
of aid allocations.
As a robustness check, we also derive the
estimation from another angle. It is possible that
donors may consider the ratio of revenue from
import duties to total tax revenue and/or the ratio
of revenue from international trade taxes to total
tax revenue in making aid allocation decisions.
For this purpose, we omit the revenue variables
in levels and include the ratios (see Table 2).
Interest  ingly, the findings without fixed effects
for both import duties and international trade
taxes in ratios now show the expected negative
sign and that they are also statistically significant
(columns 1 and 2). However, when we introduce
fixed effects in this context, we again find no sig-
nificant relation (columns 3 and 4). Based on
Younas and Bandyopadhyay
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Table 1
Dependent Variable: ln(Bilateral aid)
Without fixed effects With fixed effects
Independent variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
ln(Population) 0.972 0.925 1.952 1.969
(4.67)*** (4.40)*** (0.71) (0.69)
[ln(Population)]
2 −0.019 −0.017 −0.140 −0.148
(3.11)*** (2.85)*** (1.55) (1.61)
ln(Per capita income) 6.254 6.062 11.714  11.825
(7.49)*** (7.24)*** (4.93)*** (4.86)***
[ln (Per capita income)]
2 −0.408 −0.397 −0.784 −0.796
(7.57)*** (7.35)*** (5.14)*** (5.11)***
ln(Infant mortality) 0.244 0.215 0.033 0.039
(3.04)*** (2.61)*** (0.13) (0.15)
ln(Political and civil rights) 0.045 0.055 −0.113 −0.105
(0.63) (0.77) (0.79) (0.74)
ln(Import duties revenue) 0.059 — 0.059 —
(1.81)* (0.88)
ln(International trade tax revenues)— 0.067 — 0.069
(2.02)** (0.96)
ln(Multilateral aid) 0.154 0.146 0.074 0.075
(5.70)*** (5.32)*** (3.17)*** (3.26)***
Recipient fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimated coefficients 20 20 71 71
Wald chi-square  1,121.94 1,084.11 3,433.25 3,408.02
Log likelihood −767.10 −766.62 −550.42 −552.62
Observations 555 555 555 555
NOTE: Estimated using feasible generalized least squares allowing for recipient-specific heteroskedasticity. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. See text for detailed explanations of columns 1 through 4.likelihood-ratio tests, the fixed-effects model is the
preferred specification. This further strengthens
our finding that aid is not responsive to declining
trade revenues in developing countries.
CONCLUSION
Although trade liberalization results in greater
economic efficiency and growth, it is also a poten-
tial source of fiscal instability in developing coun-
tries because they rely heavily on revenue from
trade taxes. There is a realization among developed
nations that trade-related technical and financial
assistance should be extended to mitigate detri-
mental effects of trade reforms in developing
countries.
This article examines whether this trade rev-
enue compensation motive is observed in donor
behavior. We use aggregate bilateral aid data from
22 DAC countries to 52 aid-recipient countries
over the 1991-2003 period. Using fixed effects to
control for donors’ political, strategic, and other
considerations, we find no significant relation-
ship between aid allocation decisions and trade
revenues of recipient nations. This suggests that
the governments of developing nations may face
significant short-run challenges in the form of
Younas and Bandyopadhyay
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Table 2
Dependent Variable: ln(Bilateral aid)
Without fixed effects With fixed effects
Independent variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
ln(Population) 0.737 0.777 1.238 –0.548
(3.82)*** (4.04)*** (0.50) (0.23)
[ln(Population)]
2 −0.012 −0.013 −0.127 −0.106
(2.05)** (2.23)** (1.56) (1.34)
ln(Per capita income) 7.785 7.664 7.137 7.240
(10.03)*** (9.65)*** (3.79)*** (3.82)***
[ln (Per capita income)]
2 −0.498 −0.492 −0.523 −0.526
(9.76)*** (9.44)*** (4.30)*** (4.29)***
ln(Infant mortality) 0.512 0.463 0.032 0.019
(6.46)*** (5.71)*** (0.13) (0.07)
ln(Political and civil rights) 0.109 0.107 −0.257 −0.275
(1.68)* (1.64) (1.98)** (2.10)**
Import duties revenue/tax revenue –0.014 —– 0.009 —
(6.06)*** (1.61)
lnternational trade tax revenue/tax revenue —– 0.012 —– 0.005
(5.53)*** (0.88)
ln(Multilateral aid) 0.166 0.158 0.086 0.088
(6.33)*** (5.86)*** (3.51)*** (3.62)***
Recipient fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimated coefficients 20 20 71 71
Wald chi-square  1,745.43 1,600.40 4,121.71 4,189.03
Log likelihood −734.99 −738.44 524.33 −526.12
Observations 555 555 555 555
NOTE: Estimated using feasible generalized least squares allowing for recipient-specific heteroskedasticity. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. See text for detailed explanations of columns 1 through 4.revenue constraints as a result of declining rev-
enue collections from trade liberalization.
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APPENDIX
Data for Trade Tax Revenue Variables (Country Averages, 1991-2003, $ Millions)
Ratio of  Ratio of 
Real revenue from Real revenue from international trade tax import duties revenue
Countries international trade taxes import duties to total tax revenue to total tax revenue
Algeria 2,021.8 2,021.8 16.2 16.2
Argentina 2,122.6 1,685.4 13.8 10.3
Bhutan 1.2 0.9 4.4 3.2
Bolivia 67.7 67.7 9.5 9.5
Botswana 279.5 279.4 35.4 35.4
Brazil 2,534.6 2,533.8 5.5 5.5
Bulgaria 183.9 165.7 10.4 9.2
Burundi 35.5 25.2 26.2 18.5
Cameroon 310.0 263.3 33.0 27.6
China 5,552.2 5,552.2 13.6 13.6
Colombia 820.5 813.1 10.3 10.1
Congo DR 79.5 73.5 35.3 31.0
Côte d’Ivoire 1,124.9 640.6 60.4 34.1
Croatia 491.8 491.8 13.0 13.0
Dominican Republic 872.0 820.6 43.7 41.0
Ethiopia 247.8 188.0 35.7 27.4
Hungary 1,119.8 1,119.8 12.3 12.3
India 9,643.6 9,540.5 28.5 28.1
Indonesia 1,126.5 1,041.3 4.9 4.5
Jordan 436.3 409.1 33.6 31.6
Kenya 321.0 321.0 16.0 16.0
Latvia 29.3 29.3 3.4 3.4
Lithuania 43.7 43.0 4.8 4.6
Madagascar 174.8 167.3 54.6 51.7
Malaysia 1,839.5 1,536.4 13.1 10.9
Maldives 40.6 40.1 64.1 62.9
Mauritius 259.7 251.4 40.8 39.3
SOURCE: Government Finance Statistics (IMF, 2005) and World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006).Younas and Bandyopadhyay
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APPENDIX, cont’d
Data for Trade Tax Revenue Variables (Country Averages, 1991-2003, $ Millions)
Ratio of  Ratio of 
Real revenue from Real revenue from international trade tax import duties revenue
Countries international trade taxes import duties to total tax revenue to total tax revenue
Mexico 2,977.3 2,971.2 7.1 7.0
Moldova 20.9 14.5 9.5 6.3
Morocco 1,407.9 1,405.8 20.5 20.5
Nepal 119.6 118.0 32.7 32.4
Nicaragua 54.9 54.9 14.9 14.9
Oman 129.6 129.6 12.3 12.3
Pakistan 1,766.4 1,766.4 26.6 26.6
Papua New Guinea 259.4 196.7 30.5 23.5
Paraguay 152.8 150.9 20.1 19.7
Peru 750.7 747.7 12.6 12.5
Philippines 2,559.4 2,545.9 25.8 25.7
Poland 2,306.7 2,306.7 8.1 8.1
Romania 406.5 404.8 7.7 7.6
Seychelles 103.7 103.7 68.6 68.6
Sierra Leone 30.7 30.3 44.8 44.2
South Africa 842.9 810.6 2.9 2.8
Sri Lanka 405.7 398.8 19.9 19.5
St. Vincent and  33.9 33.1 46.6 45.6
the Grenadines
Syria 1,274.0 1,061.8 14.8 12.3
Thailand 3,083.6 3,080.9 15.7 15.7
Tunisia 967.2 947.7 28.3 27.8
Uruguay 201.3 178.3 7.5 6.6
Venezuela 1,336.3 1,332.4 12.4 12.4
Yemen 337.2 334.9 29.5 29.3
Zimbabwe 281.1 277.3 19.1 18.9
SOURCE: Government Finance Statistics (IMF, 2005) and World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006).154 MAY/JUNE 2009 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW